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Available online 2 October 2013AbstractPublic health policy for disasters is multi-faceted and complex at the local, state, and federal levels. Using a series of case studies, this manuscript
illustrates issues at each echelon. The federal example of the anthrax letter attacks in theUnited States in the fall of 2001 demonstrates key differences
between a classic bioterrorism attack with release of a weaponized, aerosolized agent and a sudden impact, defined scene event with a contaminated
letter. Additional public policy issues arise regarding surveillance and detection, and regarding disaster nomenclature, including the lack of a stan-
dardizeddefinition of the term“casualty”.A state level exampleof the influenza pandemic explains the importanceof the3SSystemofSurgeCapacity,
which consists of “Stuff” (i.e., supplies and equipment), “Staff” (i.e., personnel), and “Structure” (which contains two components: physical structure
and management infrastructure). A local example (from an international source) reveals the challenges that arise from the actual and psychological
effects of a complex event in Japan (i.e., the Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami) that included a radiation release. The healthcare policy issues
outlined in this paper are essential principles to guide emergency managers and others who are responsible for effective disaster management.
Copyright  2013, Taiwan Society of Emergency Medicine. Published by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
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Using a case study format based on my personal experi-
ences, this article will describe scenarios in the United States
(US) at the federal, state, and local levels that illustrate
key public health policy concepts. The highlighted issues
include a discussion of the bioterrorism threat, bio-
surveillance systems, and controversies regarding disaster
nomenclature. The 3S System of Surge Capacity is described
by using a pandemic example. A complex disaster that in-
cludes a radiation incident explores the psychosocial issues
in disasters.E-mail address: KKoenig@uci.edu.
2211-5587/$ - see front matter Copyright  2013, Taiwan Society of Emergency
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacme.2013.07.0012. The federal level 1999e2004: The US Department of
Veterans Affairs
In 1999, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs (VA) appointed me as National Director of the Emer-
gency Management Office, known at the time as the
Emergency Management Strategic Healthcare Group or
EMSHG. During the ensuing five-year period, I oversaw the
statutory Fourth Mission of the VA, which is emergency
management. With a staff of approximately 100 people
(approximately one-fourth of them were based at a head-
quarters just outside of Washington, D.C., USA and the
remainder were dispersed across the country) and a budget of
approximately US $8 million, this office was responsible for
ensuring disaster preparedness within the VA system and the
nation, acting in partnership with other federal agencies.Medicine. Published by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.
Table 1
US CDC category A (i.e., high threat) agents.
Requirements
Easily disseminated or transmitted from person-to-person
High mortality rate/major public health impact
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VA at that time consisted of approximately 163 hospitals (i.e.,
VA medical centers), 850 outpatient clinics, and more than
15,000 physicians, 58,000 nurses, 3600 pharmacists, and
130,000 ancillary staff. As the federal presence in the local
community, a VA facility exists in virtually every part of the
US. As the executive agent for the VA’s Fourth Mission, the
EMSHG ensured that all facilities and personnel were pre-
pared for any type of disaster or emergency.
In addition to internal preparedness for the VA system, the
EMSHG also represented VA as one of four federal partners in
the National Disaster Medical System to prepare the country
for any type of catastrophic disaster. The EMSHG furthermore
prepared VA to serve in the role of back-up to the medical
capacity of the Department of Defense (DoD) in case DoD
resources were exceeded when military casualties returned
from overseas.
As part of these duties to mitigate and prepare for disasters,
the EMSHG conducted multiple exercises and drills within the
VA system and with community partners and other federal
departments and managed the response and recovery for actual
events. The first case study is a real-life example that occurred
soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the fall of 2001
(9/11).
3. Case study number 1: Federal level bioterrorismdthe
anthrax letter attacks
Soon after the 9/11 attacks, a special secure phonedre-
gularly tested, but rarely useddrang in my office. On the other
end of the line was the Director of the National Disaster
Medical System. However, this time, it was not a drill. He was
calling to inform me that there was a case of anthraxda level
A bioterrorism agent, as classified by the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). He assured me that
this was “naturally” occurring and the patient probably con-
tracted anthrax while working on his farm. In fact, the Sec-
retary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) was quoted on the news as saying, “This is an isolated
case. There is no terrorism.” I informed my leadership and we
continued to closely monitor the situation.
Contrary to the initial reports, this was indeed terrorism and
the incident later became known as the 2001 Amerithrax At-
tacks. In brief, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, letters
containing anthrax spores were mailed to several news media
offices and two US Senators. This was an ongoing event that
lasted several weeks. There were 22 direct casualties from the
anthrax letters: five people died from inhalational of anthrax,
six people survived inhalational anthrax exposure, and 11
people contracted cutaneous anthrax.May cause public panic and social disruption
Previous development as biological warfare agents3.1. Bioterrorism threatSpecific Agents
Bacteria: Anthrax, Plague, Tularemia
Viruses: Smallpox, Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
Toxins: Botulism
US CDC ¼ United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.This was notwhat is considered the usual type of bioterrorism
threat. World Health Organization modeling predicts that 50 kg
of anthrax or tularemia that has been weaponized (i.e., modified
by terrorists) and aerosolized (i.e., dispersed through the air) overan urban population of 5 million people would result in 250,000
people contracting the disease; 100,000 deaths from anthrax, and
19,000 deaths from tularemia. However, in this case of bioter-
rorism, only a handful of people were directly exposed and the
source was letters, rather than the atmosphere.
Anthrax dissemination is a very disturbing form of bioter-
rorism. The other US CDC category A agents include plague,
tularemia, smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Ebola
virus), and botulism (Table 1).
It is important to identify patients with presentations
consistent with possible exposure to these high-threat bioter-
rorism agents. In addition to activating public health resources
when there is a suspicion of bioterrorism, law enforcement
agencies must also be alerted so they can begin the investi-
gation of a potential terrorist attack. A 24-hour, 7-day-a-week
system for accessing public health and law enforcement au-
thorities must be in place since a clinician could encounter
such a patient at any time. For example, a single case of
smallpox would, by definition, be terrorism because smallpox
has been eradicated worldwide.
There are other more common diseases that can have a
similar appearance as some of the high-threat agents. For
example, a patient with a pox-like rash could have monkey
pox rather than smallpox. If incorrectly identified, a single
such patient could cause an entire healthcare facility to shut
down because of concerns about a highly contagious and often
fatal disease. In fact, this has happened in the US because of a
concern over a case suspected smallpox that turned out not to
be smallpox.
Monkeypox, a relative of the variola virus, can be difficult
to distinguish from smallpox. Both are orthopox viruses and
the rash is similar in clinical appearance (Fig. 1). Although the
enlargement of cervical and inguinal lymph nodes is believed
to distinguish monkeypox from smallpox, this feature may not
be reliable. A careful history (for example, exposure to an
exotic pet such as a giant Gambian rat) is more likely to
support a diagnosis of monkeypox over smallpox. Although
reportable to public health in some states, monkeypox is not a
US CDC Category A bioterrorism agent.3.2. Detecting bioterrorismWhat are the ways to detect that a bioterrorism attack has
occurred? Certainly law enforcement or intelligence sources
Fig. 1. Child with monkeypox in the northern Republic of Congo (Betou).
Used with permission from Dr. Brian D’Cruz. Photo by Dr. Jospin Ntetani.
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dromic surveillance systems are in place to detect unusual
patterns or presentations of diseases so that an epidemiologic
investigation can be performed. A third way would be an
astute clinician who notices a single patient or cluster of pa-
tients with concerning signs and symptoms. In the case of the
anthrax attacks in the state of Florida in the US in the fall of
2001, it was in fact a single patient presentation that ultimately
sounded the alarm for terrorism.
Mr. Bob Stevens presented to a Florida hospital with signs
of meningitis. Doctors performed a lumbar puncture and
anthrax was detected in the cerebral spinal fluid. It was then
determined that he had contracted rapidly progressive inha-
lational (i.e., pulmonary) anthrax and had developed the
associated hemorrhagic meningitis, which can be present in up
to 50% of patients.
In addition to the inhalational form, anthrax can present as
a cutaneous (i.e., skin) form, which was the case for 11 pa-
tients in the letter attacks. The skin lesions progress through
several phases, beginning as an ulcer with a vesicular ring and
transforming into a black eschar (anthrax is the Greek word
for “coal”, which is black) with redness remaining on the skin.
A high index of suspicion must be maintained and history of
possible exposure elicited to make the correct diagnosis. To
avoid falsely activating public health and law enforcement
authorities, clinicians must distinguish cutaneous anthrax from
more common patient presentations with similarly appearing
skin lesions. These include cutaneous manifestations of brown
recluse spider bites and from methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus (MRSA).
Another US system for bioterrorism detection that was
instituted soon after 9/11 is the Biowatch Program (http://
www.dhs.gov/health-threats-resilience-division). Through this
program, a nationwide early warning network of sensors isused for detecting a biological attack. One sensor is located in
the city of Houston, TX, USA.
The secure phone in my office rang once again. My
counterpart at the HHSdthe Director of the National
Disaster Medical Systemdwas calling to inform me that the
sensor, as part of the Biowatch Program in Houston, had
detected tularemia, a Category A bioterrorism agent. I asked
him whether this was a “false positive” and he said, “No, it is
a true positive; tularemia was detected.” Unlike smallpox,
tularemia (commonly called “rabbit fever”) is present in the
environment. Therefore, I queried him about whether we
were under attack or if this was something innocuous such as
an infected rabbit brushing up against the sensor. He was
unsure. I then called the VA medical center director in the
city of Houston to inform him about the presence of tula-
remia in his community and advised him to increase sur-
veillance to determine whether more patients with influenza-
like illness were presenting to their hospital. To my surprise,
my call from far away in the nation’s capital (Washington,
DC, USA) was the first notification that the local director had
received about an evolving incident in his own community.
This fortunately was determined not to be terrorism; how-
ever, it raised an important health policy concern. Substantial
funding had been used to develop the Biowatch Program, yet
robust procedures were lacking for interpreting the data that
we were collecting and translating them into action. A solid
public health policy should encompass an entire system for
surveillance that includes methods to interpret and act on the
results of findings.3.3. Disaster nomenclatureAn additional concern is the lack of standardized nomen-
clature when describing disasters. How many casualties
resulted from the Amerithrax attacks? We know about 22
direct casualties, but what about the huge psychological
impact this event had across the entire country? People were
afraid to open their mail. Some people were even microwaving
their mail prior to opening it (which has no scientific basis for
protection). The attacker had created fear and disrupted soci-
ety, even though the number of people directly affected was
very small.
There is no standardized definition of disaster casualty.
Some reports use “casualty” to mean “immediate death”,
whereas others use the same term to define persons who are
alive and have sustained injuries and illnesses directly from an
event. There can also be “secondary” casualties, for example,
people with exacerbations of underlying medical conditions
because of the lack of access to regular primary care or routine
medications.
Historical nomenclature systems for disasters have included
classifying disasters by the number of casualties, but the
number of casualties is not the most important consideration.
Classification systems have also considered the origin of the
disaster (e.g., internal or external to a hospital). This also is not
the most relevant issue, and many disasters (e.g., an earth-
quake) can be at the same time internal and external to a
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disaster (e.g., natural or manmade). From a public health
perspective, the impact of the event on the healthcare infra-
structure and the ability to care for patients are much more
important than etiology. Furthermore, the origin of the disaster
may not initially be known. A prime example is the attack by a
religious cult in the US in the state of Oregon in 1984 in which
they sprayed Salmonella in local salad bars in an attempt to
make people too sick to vote in an upcoming election for a
political candidate they opposed. This attack remained unde-
tected for many years and was originally investigated by
public health authorities as a natural outbreak. Another
example would be a wildfire set by an arsonistdthis is
certainly not a naturally occurring event, but it is managed in
the same manner from the medical and health perspectives as
would be a fire that started naturally.
A disaster can be defined as a condition or situation, with or
without casualties for which the available resources are inad-
equate. In other words, a disaster occurs when local resources
are exhausted or overwhelmed. This is the key concept and
more relevant for the management of the event than are de-
scriptors such as the number of casualties, the origin of the
disaster, or the etiology of the incident. For example, the
biological anthrax letter attacks in the US in 2001 were
managed more like traditional chemical events. We knew
precisely when and where they happened and sent a “lights
and siren” response. This is sometimes termed a “sudden
impact, defined scene” or SIDS event. This differs from a
classic bioterrorism attack, which would typically be unan-
nounced and undetected until days later when people who
were initially in the same location present to hospitals, clinics,
and doctors’ offices with nonspecific influenza-like illnesses,
and an epidemiological investigation is undertaken.
4. The state level 2005e2010: The state of California,
Emergency Preparedness Office
After a 5-year appointment, I left federal government
service and returned to academia at the University of
California. In this capacity, I worked concurrently as a
consultant on public health preparedness for the State of
California.
5. Case study number 2: State level5.1. PandemicTable 2
Surge SystemdThe 3S Concept.
Stuff (supplies and equipment)
Staff (personnel)
Specialized expertise
Behavioral issues e Will staff come to work?
Structure
Physical space (alternate care sites)
Management infrastructure e Incident Command SystemOne day, my phone rang. This time is was a state official
telling me that the Governor’s office would like to know how
many ventilators to purchase (in excess of our current state-
wide stocks) to be prepared for an influenza pandemic. I
reiterated my concerns, which I had already stated many times
at state health policy advisory group meetings, that ventilators
do not take care of patients and that we needed to enact an
entire management system. I was advised that they understood
this; however, the Governor wanted a number. After reviewing
the current statewide data, consulting with a colleague, andusing a CDC calculation tool, we determined that 2400 addi-
tional ventilators should be purchased. This was communi-
cated and implemented. However, my concerns remained. It is
difficult to quantify preparedness; a simple listing of numbers
of stockpiled equipment such as ventilators and medications
such as antivirals alone is insufficient and only one of the
necessary components of a Surge System. This number, in
isolation, did not have a lot of meaning.5.2. Surge capacitydthe 3S Surge SystemSurge capacity is required when patient care needs exceed
currently available resources. The focus on patient care is
essential. Cost-containment strategies such as just-in-time
supplies are effective for day-to-day operations; however,
cost-containment systems lack excess capacity. When a
disaster strikes, these systems have insufficient supplies.
Therefore, a surge system is required for catastrophic events
(Table 2).
The traditional focus in disasters has been on “Stuff” such
as purchasing pharmaceuticals and supplies (e.g., antiviral
medications, ventilators, and decontamination equipment).
“Stuff” is tangible and measurable and visible and is clearly
one important component of a Surge System. However, it is
insufficient.
In addition to supplies and equipment, “staff” or
personnel are needed to provide care to the victims of the
disaster. This is more than just a certain number of personnel
and can also include healthcare providers with special types
of expertise (e.g., infectious disease experts, neurosurgeons,
psychologists), depending on the nature of the disaster.
Furthermore, planners must anticipate that some personnel
will not report for work. This could be either because they
are unable (e.g., injured, dead, lack of transportation) or
unwilling (e.g., fear of contracting a contagious infectious
disease and transmitting it to family members).
Healthcare facilities must be prepared to receive unex-
pected people, including victims, staff, and others. Victims
commonly arrive unannounced by private transportation,
rather than via the emergency medical services system. Family
and friends of victims may present demanding information
about loved ones. Well-meaning volunteers who may not be
adequately trained or protected from harm will show up un-
announced as well. The media will come seeking information
to cover the evolving story. The convergence of injured or ill
persons, relatives and friends, volunteers, off-duty staff and
medical personnel, and the media can overwhelm the system
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diverted to manage the influx.
The third component of a surge system is “structure”,
which consists of two separate components: (1) the physical
structure for patient care and (2) the management structure to
coordinate resources. The physical location for patient care
could be an existing healthcare facility such as a hospital or an
alternate care site such as a school or sports stadium. The
management structure is a critical component of disaster
management and can be termed an Incident Management
System (ICS) or if it exists within a hospital a Hospital Inci-
dent Management System (HICS).
The US has historically rarely seen large-scale cata-
strophic disasters. In the pre-9/11 era, a study of 29 US di-
sasters with more than 1000 casualties (but not the tens or
hundreds of thousands seen in large scale events) revealed
that in only 6% of cases were there supply shortages and in
only 2% of cases were there personnel shortages. The chal-
lenge in managing these disasters was likely to be a lack of
an incident management system to coordinate available re-
sources rather than a true scarcity of resources. Certainly in
large scale events, an actual resource scarcity would exist (at
least during some periods of time); however, this situation
would make the incident management system even more
important. Recent work is focusing on allocation of scarce
resources in a disaster, including the evolving concept of
“Crisis Standard of Care” and the development of community
resilience.
6. The local level 2011epresent: The University of
California at Irvine, CA, Center for Disaster Medical
Sciences (CDMS)
In the aftermath of the Haitian Earthquake, I proposed the
establishment of the Center for Disaster Medical Sciences
(CDMS) at the University of California at Irvine (Irvine, CA,
USA; www.cdms.uci.edu). In 2011, the Dean of the School of
Medicine authorized the CDMS and appointed me as director.
7. Case study number 3: Local level (from an
international source)dradiation
Once again, my phone rang. The date was March 11, 2011
and the event was the Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami
in Japan. In this case, it was the Dean of the School of
Medicine, and he wanted to know how we could help the
victims in Japan. Certainly our hearts went out to the victims
and we desired to assist. However, we were also on alert
ourselves because the authorities had issued a tsunami warning
for the west coast of California. We were indeed evacuating!
Tsunamis are very unpredictable and we were fortunate that
the tsunami that came across the Pacific Ocean to our com-
munity turned out to be very small when it struck and did not
cause any harm.
Concerned but uneducated people were purchasing large
quantities of potassium iodide out of fear of the unknown
radiation exposure. In the ensuring days, we were very busywith media inquiries and quelling the public’s concern about a
“radiation cloud” that was about to strike southern California.
The tragedy in Japan was an extremely complex event that
included an earthquake, tsunami, radiation release, and even
volcanic activity. The radiation event was particularly difficult
to manage because radioactive material cannot be seen or
smelled and people tend to have a fear of the unknown. There
were multiple challenges with crisis and emergency risk
communications, triage protocols, population-based psycho-
social interventions, and changing policies for the precise
radius of the mass evacuations in Japan.
Teams that did respond from outside the country faced is-
sues about protecting themselves from radiation exposure. In
addition, they experienced cultural challenges such as a lan-
guage barrier that severely limited their ability to effectively
assist. The bottom line was that disaster medical assistance
teams from other countries could not easily respond to assist
the victims in Japan.
8. Conclusion
This paper examines key public health policy concepts at
the US federal, state and local levels by using a series of case
studies. The federal level example of bioterrorism illustrates
the difference between an aerosolized release of anthrax with a
predicted quarter of a million people contracting the disease
and the SIDS event via anthrax letters that infected 22 people.
Also discussed are public policy issues surrounding surveil-
lance and detection and disaster nomenclature, including the
lack of a standardized definition of “casualty”. The state level
example of pandemic influenza preparedness is used to show
the importance of a comprehensive strategy for Surge Ca-
pacity. The 3S System of Surge Capacity consists of: “stuff”
(i.e., supplies and equipment), “staff” (i.e., personnel), and
“structure” (i.e., physical structure and management infra-
structure). The local example (which came from an interna-
tional source) reveals the challenges resulting from the actual
and psychological effects of a radiation incident. Through use
of the healthcare policy principles illustrated in this paper,
emergency managers and others involved in disaster mitiga-
tion, preparedness, response, and recovery can reduce
suffering and improve outcomes.
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